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COMMENTS
alimony pendente lite.'9 But strangely enough, although there are only
nine or ten states that make it the duty of the wife to support an incapa-
citated husband where she is able, 30 yet the two cases most strongly
holding that a husband cannot get alimony pendente lte without statu-
tory authority, both being cited to support the instant case, come from
two such jurisdictions-California and North Dakota.31
It may be said that a small portion of American husbands are here
concerned. The number of cases where husbands request alimony
pendente lite is not large; nor are there many jurisdictions where a
statute imposes upon the wife even a qualified duty of support.
Perhaps, therefore, the extent of judicial injustice that calls for remedy
is slight. But it may well be argued that in the other cases the legisla-
tive injustice should also be remedied. 32  As poor a creature as the
husband who needs alimony, either temporary or permanent, may seem
to be, he exists, and the penalties already laid on him by life for his
incapacities should not be made heavier by law. If "equal rights"
mean anything, this is certainly one of the things they should mean.3 3
PLEADING NEGLIGENCE
The appearance of a new edition of the official Connecticut Practice
Book,1 containing additions to the official forms of pleading, serves to
call attention anew to the difficulties involved in the statement of the
cause of action under the codes. To illustrate the problem involved it
-Iowa, supra note 28, sec. 3177; Lindsay v. Lindsay (192o) 189 Iowa, 326, 178
N. W. 384; N. D. supra note 28, sec. 4402; Ohio, supra note 27, sec. 11994;
Okla. supra note 27, sec. 4967; Utah Comp. Laws, 1917, sec. 2998.
" Calif. supra note 23, sec. 176; Conn. Pub. Acts, 192o-1921, ch. 99, 1oi
(pauper) ; Ohio, supra note 27, sec. 7995; *Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 2178;
Okla. supra note 27, sec. 3351; N. D. supra note 23, sec. 44o9; S. D. Rev. Code,
igig, sec. 167; Wis. Sts. 1898, sec. 15o2, as amended by Laws, 1907, ch. 224.
'State, e.x rel. Hagert, v. Templeton, supra note 19; Eisenring v. Sitperio&
Court (1917) 34 Calif. App. 749, 168 Pac. 1O62. It is believed that the only other
cases in which this question has been squarely decided, and contra to the husband's
claims (except Groth v. Groth, supra note I8), are also in such jurisdictions.
Brenger v. Brenger (191o) 142 Wis. 26, 125 N. W. 1O9; Poloke v. Poloke (1913)
37 Okla. 7o, 130 Pac. 535 (neither permanent nor temporary alimony permitted).
' There is an obvious social necessity for the compulsion on the husband to
support his wife--"the danger of (her) becoming a public charge." Tenn. Code,
supra note 27, sec. 4249; 55 CENT. L. Jous. 383, at p. 385. Is there not just as
much reason for relieving taxpayers of this additional burden where the husband
cannot support himself and the wife has the means to contribute?
"The convention of the National Woman's Party, held at Washington, Novem-
ber iith and i2th, 1922, has officially recommended alimony for husband and wife
on equal terms, .by approving the North Dakota and Iowa laws (cited supra notes
23 and 28) as models. New York Times, November 13, 1922, p. 9. Equal terms,
however, would not require the giving of alimony to the husband in very many
instances.
' Connecticut Practice Book (922), compiled by a committee of the judges of
the Superior Court.
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seems apt to consider the manner in which a cause of action based upon
the defendant's negligence must be stated.
It is possible to characterize common-law pleading, code pleading, and
the modern brief pleading developed in a few courts, as issue-pleading,
fact-pleading, and notice-pleading respectively. 2 This emphasizes the
chief purpose supposed to be achieved by each system. Thus the glory
of the common-law system was supposed to be that the parties proceeded
by successive steps until one affirmed and the other denied a single
point, which then became the sole matter to be tried.3  Under the codes
it was expected that each party would tell his story "'in simple and
concise language" and the court would apply the necessary law to these
facts. Hence the pleader must state merely the "dry, naked, actual
facts."'4 And under notice -pleading the office of the pleading is simply
to put the other side on notice in a general way of the pleader's claim.5
But after all this is only to single out and emphasize the most impor-
tant feature of each system. Under common-law pleading the facts
were stated, even though it was not quite so heinous an offense as under
the codes to mix a little law therewith, and the pleadings did serve the
function of notice; while under code pleading issues are created, and
under notice pleading the facts are stated, though quite generically.
The real difference is one of degree-as Holmes considers all legal
distinctions to be-in the particularity of the statement of the facts.
The least successful of these systems has been the code system and the
reason therefor is in the main the failure to recognize the true nature
of the distinction just noted and the consequent vain attempt to restrict
the pleading to only "the ultimate facts," excluding on the one hand
evidential facts and on the other legal conclusions.6 Code pleading of
course justified itself for certain of its reforms, such as the abolition of
forms of action and the amalgamation of law and equity. But in the
statement of the cause of action the common law was more successful
and the reaction from code pleading must necessarily be towards the
common law. The difference between the statement under notice
pleading and the common-law statement, stripped of its verbiage and
reiteration, is certainly not great.
'See Pound (192o) 33 H~Av. L. Rav. 326, reviewing Works, Juridical Reform
(igig); Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 HAav. L. REv. 501.
'Stephen, Pleading (Williston's ed. 1895) 136, stating that the main object of
the common-law system of pleading was to ascertain the subject for decision by the
production of an issue.
"Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed. 19o4) 56o. Quoted by Cook, Statements
of Fact in Pleading under the Codes (1921) 21 CoL. L. REV. 416.
5 Whittier, supra note 2.
For a statement of the problem involved, see Cook, supra note "4; Isaacs, The
Law at the Facts (1922) 22 CoT. L. REv. i. Among criticisms of code pleading
in this regard, see Pound, supra note 2; Works, op. cit. supra note 2, 45 (con-
sidering that the rule may be sound in theory, but indulging in sound criticism of
its practical application).
COMMENTS
A conspicuous example of the failure of the code ideal is the use of
the "common counts" under the codes. These counts, developed in
the common-law action of indebitatus assumpsit, set forth the defen-
dant's indebtedness to the plaintiff in very general form. But to say
that A is indebted to B for a conversion and sale of A's personalty is
to state a legal conclusion drawn from the law of waiver of tort, and the
addition of the fictitious promise to pay adds no fact. Hence it is not
surprising to find bitter objection to the common counts voiced by advo-
cates of fact-pleading such as Pomeroy 7 But here again the distinction
is between a general and a specific statement. To say that A is married
is to state a legal conclusion and yet in common every-day speech it is
also a generalization of fact and should be treated as such." And so the
common courts, which did furnish short and simple forms of statement
in cases where intricate and involved explanation was neither necessary
nor desirable, have been in general use under the codes, notwithstanding
the objections of those who emphasized an unsound theory and did not
perceive the needs of practical convenience.9
So in stating the ordinary negligence action the problem is to deter-
mine how specifically the occurrence in question should be detailed. It
is generally said that facts showing the right-duty relation, the breach,
and the resulting damage, must be set up. But what is needed to show
the defendant's duty and his breach? Let us take the case which has
become increasingly important with the use of the automobile, that of
injury caused by careless driving on a highway. The gist of the
statement at common law was that the defendant so carelessly (unskill-
fully, improperly, etc.) drove his horse that through his carelessness his
horse struck the plaintiff's horse and cart, injuring the plaintiff."'
There may be kinds of default unknown to the age of the horse which
may be committed by a motorist, and yet under the forms appearing in
the statutes of Massachusetts-where under a modified common-law
procedure the good of the old system has been preserved while its
defects have been discarded-a like allegation is provided for the auto-
mobile accident case.11 Under the codes, too, it seems clearly to have
been the view originally that the same kind of statement should be
' Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 4, 584-590; Sunderland, Cases on Code Pleading
(1913) 269; 34 L. R. A. (N. s.) 364, note."Jessel, M. R., in Eaglefield v. Marquis of Liedenderry (1876) L. R. 4 Ch. 693,
7o2, quoted by Cook, supra note 4.
S'upra note 7.
W illiams v. Holland (1833, C. P.) io Bing. 112; 2 Chitty, Pleadinzg (7th ed.
1844) 529.
'Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 231, sec. 147, no. 13: "And the plaintiff says that
the defendant so negligently and unskillfully drove a motor vehicle in a public
highway called street, in Boston, that by reason thereof the said
motor vehicle struck the plaintiff who was then properly crossing the said highway
whereby the plaintiff was thrown down. .. ."
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used.1 2  And under notice pleading the form suggested by its chief
advocate seems not dissimilar except for the omission of the word
"carelessly.' 13
Nevertheless there seems to have developed a feeling on the part of
both bench and bar that the "particular acts" of negligence must be
stated.' 4 This attitude is exemplified by rulings of varying strict-
ness. Perhaps the prevailing view is to require the plaintiff to
state explicitly each successive act by the defendant leading to the
injury, but he is still, by the more general rule, permitted to character-
ize such acts as having been negligently done and such characteriza-
tion is held to show the breach of duty to the plaintiff. 5 Some courts,
however, hold that the word "negligently" means nothing as a
statement of fact,, and the breach of duty must be otherwise shown.' 6
" See forms in Maxwell, Code Pleading (1892) 724 (taken, as the author says,
from 2 Chitty, Pleading (1855) 86o) ; Phillips, Code Pleading (1896) sec. 5o3;
Bryant, Code Pleading (2d ed. 1899) 338; Bliss, Code Pleading (3d ed. 1894)
sec. 211; Connecticut Practice Book, op. cit. supra note 1, 452; Abbott, Forms of
Pleading (2d ed. 1918) 1O37, 1O39; Alden, Handbook of Practice under the Civil
Practice Act of New York (1921) 68. Such complaints have been held sufficient
against motion. Hanson v. Anderson (1895) 90 Wis. 195, 62 N. W. 1055;
Hicks v. Seraio (1911) 74 Misc. 274, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1102; aff'd. (1912) 149
App. Div. 926, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1126; see also Oldfield v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry.
(1854, C. P.) 3 E. D. Smith, 1O3; aff'd. (1856) 14 N. Y. 31o; Peterson v.
Eighmie (196) 175 App. Div. 113, 161 N. Y. Supp. io65; cf. Leny v. Pahze
(1921) 197 App. Div. 581, 188 N. Y. Supp. 6oi.
" Whittier, supra note 2, at p. 504: ". . . . the plaintiff claims damages for
personal injuries sustained by being struck by the defendant's motorcycle about
August I, 1916."
'4 Thus it has been concluded from the cases that where a petition contains but a
general allegation of negligence it is subject to a motion to make more definite and
certain. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 4, 682, note by Professor Bogle. Missouri,
although complaints in the common-law form have been sustained in that juris-
diction, has now ruled that such a statement is vulnerable on motion. Van Bibber
v. Welhitan Fruit Co. (1922, Kansas City Ct. of App.) 234 S. W. 356; but see
Mack v. St. L., K. C. & N. Ry. (1883) 77 Mo. 232; Sullivan v. Mo. Pac. Ry.
(1888) 97 Mo. 1, 1O S. W. 852; Pope v. K. C. Cable Ry. (1889) 99 Mo. 400, 12
S. W. 891; COMMENTS (1922) 7 ST. L. L. REv. 142.
"Hill v. Fair Haven. & W. Ry. (1902) 75 Conn. 177, 52 AtI. 725; Bunnell v.
Berlin Iron Bridge Co. (1895) 66 Conn. 24, 33 AtI. 533; 29 Cyc. 570. Apparently,
here also, the manner in which the negligent act may be a breach of duty must
be apparent to the court See O'Keefe v. Nat. Folding Box & Paper Co. (895)
66 Conn. 38, 33 AtI. 587 (complaint which alleged that the plaintiff was negli-
gently put to work by the defendant in placing colored paper saturated with
poison into a box heated with steam as a result of which he was poisoned, was
defective in failing to state facts making it the duty of the defendant to know that
the paper was poisonous).
" Thus an averment that the persons in charge of a locomotive engine carelessly
and negligently and without giving warning ran it at a reckless and high rate of
speed upon a switch track where the plaintiff was at work, and negligently and
carelessly disconnected a freight car therefrom, leaving it to run with great force
against other cars on the track and forced them against the plaintiff, was held
COMMENTS
And the English precedents call for a specification of the particulars
of negligence.Y7
With such an attitude shown by various tribunals it is but to be
expected that lawyers, following the legal axiom of safety first, will see
that their complaints are specific beyond question, and hence we have the
intricate, complex, verbose, repetitious, and ridiculous complaints of
modern pleading. The forms in the new Connecticut Practice Book
well illustrate this development. They have been prepared under official
authority to accompany the Connecticut Practice Act, one of the most
successful codes in this country. The forms which accompanied the
original Practice Act have contributed greatly to its success.'" In the
new edition all the original forms seem to have been retained and we
still find the old liberal precedents such as that the defendant "carelessly
drove against the wagon of the plaintiff, and thereby broke and injured
the same" ;19 but the new forms which have been added are of a different
sort. Thus a form of complaint for damages resulting from an automo-
bile collision contains a paragraph stating the collision in the old style,
but in another paragraph there is added the allegation that "the damage
to the plaintiff's automobile was caused by the negligence of the defen-
dant in that, etc.," specifying several particulars such as speed, failure
to keep a look out, and failure to sound a warning. 20 Another form,
insufficient to show a duty to the plaintiff. Chicago & Erie Ry. v. Lain (1907)
170 Ind. 84, 83 N. E. 632. So an allegation in an action against a city that there
was a hole in a city street and that the plaintiff riding a bicycle struck "said
defective, unsafe and out of repair street, and by reason of said street being out
of repair as aforesaid, defective, and unsafe, she was thrown violently, etc.," was
held to fail to show that the defect in the street was the proximate cause of the
injury. City of Logansport v. Kehm (1902) 159 Ind. 68, 64 N. E. 598. This rule
has been changed by statute in Indiana, providing that "all conclusions stated"
shall be held allegations of fact unless attacked by motion. Acts 1913, ch. 322,
sec. i, amended by Acts, 19,5, ch. 62, sec. i; Bums' Ann. Ind. Sts. 1918, sec. 343a;
Sclosser v. Nicholson (1916) 184 Ind. 283, III N. E. 13; Fisher v. Carey
(918) 67 Ind. App. 438, 9ig N. E. 376.
T See Bullen & Leake, Precedents of Pleading (7th ed. 1915) 367 et seq., with
notes thereon.
'One reason for the success of the Connecticut Practice Act was that it was
not adopted until 1879, when there was available the experience of the other code
states and also the English reforms expressed in the Judicature Act. Many
desirable features of the English Practice, such as pleading in the alternative,
which are only now coming into general recognition in this country, have long
been available in Connecticut. For historical note, see the Prefatory Note to the
original Act, which is reprinted in this edition of the Practice Book. See also
Hepburn, Development of Code Pleading (1897) 12o. For a favorable reference
to the original forms, see Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 423, note.
2 Connecticut Practice Book, op. cit. supra note 1, 452.
"Ibid. 412. This also contains an allegation that the plaintiff was in the exercise
of due care. The "defense" of contributory negligence is available under a
simple denial. Ibid. 290, 291. But this seems not to require the useless formality
of pleading due care. The form, "Negligence in Operation of Motorcycle," is
also interesting. Ibid. 412. It is based upon the complaint in a recent Connecticut
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"Negligence in Operation of an Airplane," gives a modern touch. In
the first paragraph it is alleged that the plaintiff resides at a specified
address in Bridgeport, an allegation entirely immaterial but possibly
designed to supply the lack of the very necessary allegation that the
plaintiff owned the house which was injured. Next follows an allega-
tion of the defendant's corporate capacity, 21 and that it was engaged in
the carrying of passengers on "short" flights for a profit in airplanes
from a specified field. Next comes a long paragraph detailing the flight
in question from its inception, and only at the end of the paragraph is
the airplane at length conducted to a point "just west of plaintiff's"premises." In two more paragraphs the crash into "plaintiff's resi-
dence" and the resultant injury thereto are stated.
The next form is perhaps the most suggestive of all. It deals with
the complicated situation of a guest in a motor vehicle suing the owner
of the vehicle and the trolley company together.22  It is taken almost
word for word from a complaint recently before the court.23  Here may
be asked a question as to the purpose of the forms. The compilers of
the original forms stated that they were "designed to guide, not to
hamper, the profession."24  But are they supposed to be models or only
examples of what will pass the court? The complaint is too long to be
considered in detail. It contains eight intricate and involved para-
graphs. The accident is described with such particularity as may be
indicated by the following: "When the automobile had reached a point
close to the trolley track pole marked '15.'" After a very full statement
of the various occurrences, there is added a paragraph containing thir-
teen finely printed lines specifying particular acts of negligence upon
the part of each defendant. An interesting feature of the complaint is
the allegation that the trolley car struck the automobile a "tremendous
blow close to the rear door on the right hand side of the automobile."
[Italics ours.]
Should a defendant be entitled to a more specific statement where the
complaint is in the old common-law form? He should if he is actually
misled, and this was true at common law. The power at common law
to order a bill of particulars in all kinds of cases is undoubted.2 5  But
case, without correcting the defect there criticized of failing to bring the defendant
within the terms of a governing statute. Gargan v. Harris (1916) go Conn. 188,
96 Atl. 940.
Apparently unnecessary in view of Conn. Gen. Sts. igi , sec. 5632, .requiring
the defendant by a special denial to raise the question of lack of right to sue as a
corporation. Merwin v. Richardson (2884) 52 Conn. 233; Goodsell v. McElroy
Bros. Co. (1912) 86 Conn. 402, 85 AtI. 5o9.
' Connecticut Practice Book, op. cit. supra note 1, 413-415.
=See Dickerson v. Connecticut Ca. (1922) 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518; see also
Records, ist Judicial District, Oct. 1922. The complaint is signed by a leading
lawyer of Hartford.
=' Connecticut Practice Book, op. cit. supra note i, v.
" Tilton v. Beecher (874) 59 N. Y. 176; Johnson. v. Birley (2822, K. B.) 5
Barn. & Ald. 540 (in trespass for assault and battery) ; 31 Cyc. 565.
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the test here should be empirical, depending on the form of complaint.
The defendant should be forced to convince the court that he actually
needs the information asked for in order to prepare his defense. The
old practice of requiring supporting affidavits to a motion seems desir-
able.26  The result should be that normally a general statement of the
accident should be sufficient even as against a motion to make more
specific.2 7  A defendant will of course endeavor to tie the plaintiff down
to particular specifications of negligence in order to obtain the benefit
of the rule that such specifications limit the proof to the defaults speci-
fied.28  It is naturally a part of the game for the defendant to catch a
plaintiff in this manner. But outside of this technical advantage what
actual difference can it make to a defendant who has prepared his case
as it should be, whether or not the plaintiff specifies that the defendant
failed to sound a horn? It may be urged that large corporations who
act only through agents cannot know or ascertain the exact facts of an
accident unless so informed by the plaintiff. But so, too, the plaintiff
cannot be sure how his witnesses are going to state the minute details
of the affair until they get on the witness stand. The actual preparation
for each side will be the same, however such details are finally to be
understood, and there seems no fair reason for putting such a restric-
tion on the plaintiff. It will probably amount to nothing more than to
compel the plaintiff to amend at the trial, thus adding further to the
confusion of the record. And with a careful lawyer on the other side
the defendant defeats his own purpose, for the plaintiff will set up all
manner of allegations of negligence, though he need prove but a single
one. The true principle here should be that of reasonable notice to the
defendant, the reasonableness of such notice to be decided upon the basis
that the defendant is a person who may be assumed to have some
previous knowledge of the affair in question.
'Johnson v. Birley, supra note 25; 31 Cyc. 585.
' Whether 'the common-law form is still sufficient in Connecticut is not entirelyclear. It has been held sufficient in the absence of a motion to make more definite
and certain. Eckert v. Levznson (1917) 91 Conn. 338, 99 AtI. 699; Jordan v.
Apter (1919) 93 Conn. 3o2, iO5 At. 620; Kearns v. Widinan (1919) 94 Conn.
257, io8 At. 661; Sliwowski v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. (1920) 94 Conn. 303, io8Atl. 805. In the Kearns case there is a statement that the specific acts or circum-
stances of negligence should be pleaded, but the supporting citation, 17 C. J.ioo6, shows that the court had in mind only the particular question there involved,
namely, what allegations were necessary to furnish a basis for a claim of exem-plary damages in a negligence action. The attitude of the Court in the Sliwowski
case, where they said that they were not much impressed by the defendant's con-
tention that it had in fact been misled, seems the proper one. "The Practice Act
was designed to simplify our legal procedure, and to abbreviate pleadings by theomission of all unnecessary allegations." Baldwin, J., in Fisrher, Bromn & Co.
v. Fielding (1895) 67 Conn. 9I, 103, 34 Atl. 714, 716 (that a foreign court "duly
adjudged" that a defendant should pay held sufficient).
'N. E. Fruict & Produce Co. v. Hines (1922) 97 Conn. 225, 235, 116 AUt. 243,
247; Capell v. N. Y. Transp. Co. (1912) 15o App. Div. 723, 135 N. Y. Supp. 8o6;
1o C. J. 361.
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But even if not required, may the plaintiff plead specifically when he
so desires? His incentive is likely to be that way, first because he
wishes to be safe and, secondly in the vain hope of being more impres-
sive. The "tremendous blow" was perhaps penned with an eye to the
jury. Here we must allow the plaintiff much latitude and perhaps we
ought not to prevent him from so pleading. The great fault of the
code was the attempt to state an arbitrary rule of thumb which could
always be applied, thus overlooking the fact that the code is really only
a tool to enable the court to get judicial business done fairly and con-
veniently. The code should be a means to an end, not an end in itself,
and hence there is danger in arbitrary limitations in form of pleading.
Something may be done however to avoid counsel's natural lawyerlike
propensity to verbosity. If there is no penalty of any kind attached to
pleading briefly, not even the penalty of delay to allow the defendant to
criticize and the court to examine the pleading, a main incentive to
prolixity is gone. In addition the court may achieve a considerable
result by reproving informally and without a definite ruling those
lawyers who violate sound rules of pleading. And finally the court may
exercise at least somewhat more frequently than it now does, its power
to strike out "unnecessary repetition, prolixity," "or the incorporation
of irrelevant, immaterial or evidential matter" in a pleading "or other-
wise [to] correct" a pleading.29
C. E. C.
LEGAL SEARCH AND ARREST UNDER THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT
Many difficult problems have arisen in connection with the Eight-
eenth Amendment.' And not the least of these is that of enforcing it
in a constitutional manner. Although the states are not affected by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, similar
provisions exist in practically all of the state constitutions.2 The
Fourth Amendment reads as follows: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
" Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 5639. Under the rule, sec. 226, the remedy is to be
granted only in a clear case, and the court has discountenanced its use. Connecti-
cut Practice Book, op. cit. supra note 1, 295; Donovan v. Davis (1912) 85 Conn.
394, 398, 82 Atl. 1025, 1026.
The Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, sec. i, provides:
"After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from, the United States and all territories subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."
'Art. II, sec. 1o of the Michigan Constitution: "The person, houses, papers and
possessions of every person shall be exempt from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall
issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation."
